Publisher description for Coercive cooperation : explaining multilateral economic sanctions / Lisa L. Martin.
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This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility.
Library of Congress subject headings for this publication: Economic sanctions, Economic sanctions Case studies, International economic relations, International cooperation, World politics