Publisher description for The political economy of public administration : institutional choice in the public sector / Murray J. Horn.
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This book applies the basic ideas and models of economics to develop a single transactions framework to explain the key institutional arrangements across the whole range of public sector organization: the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau, and the state-owned enterprise. This book also explores the link between agency form and administrative function, agency independence from the legislature, the rights extended to private interests to influence administrative decision making, the role of civil service arrangements that are so often seen as simply frustrating efficiency and responsiveness, and the boundary between public and private sectors. This book should be of value to those with a practical interest in public administration as well as students of political science, public administration, economics, and public policy.
Library of Congress subject headings for this publication: Public administration, Transaction costs, Administrative agencies, Executive departments, Independent regulatory commissions, Government business enterprises